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Abstract
The well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm is a solution to the stable marriage problem, but always results in the same stable marriage, regardless of how the algorithm
is executed. Robert Irving and Paul Leather constructed the rotation poset, whose
downward closed sets are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of stable marriage assignments. We discuss how to use the rotation poset to find the k-optimal
matching, and prove that a k-optimal matching is the same as a minimum regret
matching for high enough k. Finally, Dan Gusfield defines the rotation poset for the
stable roommate problem, and uses it to efficiently enumerate all stable roommate
assignments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Consider that we have a group of men and women, and we are tasked with matching
pairs of men and women in a “good” way. That is, we wish to match them in such
a way that the pairs are unlikely to break up. Each man ranks all the women as an
ordered list, according to their preference, and vice versa. For a matching to be good,
there should be no choice of man and woman who would both prefer each other to their
current match. Otherwise, that man and woman would agree to drop their current
match in favor of each other, resulting in a breakup. We call a matching without these
pairs a stable matching. This problem is called the stable matching problem. David
Gale and Lloyd Shapley proved in 1962 that there always exists a stable matching
regardless of how each man and woman ranks the opposite sex. They also constructed
an algorithm which finds a stable matching. Gale and Shapley were awarded the 2012
Nobel Prize in Economics for their work in this area. One application in economics
involves distributing resources among people in a “good” way. Gale and Shapley’s
algorithm is also currently used to match medical students to residency programs
in the National Resident Matching Program (How the Matching Algorithm Works
2016). The Gale-Shapley algorithm also provides an “optimal” solution to one of the
two groups involved. For example, in the application just mentioned, the algorithm
results in a matching that is optimal for the students. This means that each student
is matched with his or her best possible match out of all stable matchings which may
exist.
However, not all stable matchings are necessarily good matchings. Consider a
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scenario in which each man is matched to his first choice and each woman is matched
to her last choice. Such a matching is considered to be stable, since no man would
prefer a different partner, but from the women’s point of view, the situation is not
ideal. Thus, a matching which favors only one of the two groups is not always
desirable, even if stable. We examine a mathematical structure which allows us to
obtain a good grasp on all of the possible stable matchings. This structure leads to
being able to calculate the matching with the best “average happiness” efficiently.
This structure, discovered by Robert W. Irving and Paul Leather, is mathematically
more pleasing (because of its size and structure) than a set of rankings which do not
give any insight to what the stable matchings are.
A generalization to the stable matching problem is called the stable roommate
problem. Instead of having two groups being matched to each other, there is only one
group and we want to pair up people within that group. The application in the name
of the problem is to match roommate pairs in a group of students. Dan Gusfield generalizes the structure results of Irving and Leather to the stable roommate problem.
Gusfield uses this structure to provide a way to list all possible stable matchings in a
relatively efficient manner. However, depending on the number of participants in the
matching process, the number of possible stable matchings can be an extremely large
number, so finding all stable matchings may take a long time for the simple reason
that many stable matchings may exist. Since the stable roommate problem and its
structure are generalizations of the stable marriage problem, Gusfield’s method can
also enumerate all of the stable marriages in a given problem. Unfortunately, a stable roommate assignment does not always exist. Research has been done in finding
a suitable assignment in the case that no stable assignments exists. For example,
Abraham, Biró, and Manlove (2006) discuss the problem of finding a matching with
the least amount of pairs violating the definition of stability. This research, however,
will not be discussed in this thesis.

2

Overall, the structure results of Irving, Leather, and Gusfield can lead to the
ability to find the “right” stable matching for the application in mind, noting that
not all stable matchings are appropriate. For example, the situation discussed above
which favors one particular group, or possibly a stable matching in which all but one
person has a match they are happy with, but that one person gets paired with his or
her last choice.

3

Chapter 2
The Structure of the Stable Marriage Problem
2.1

Basic Definitions and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

We assume the reader has basic knowledge of graph theoretic definitions. Such definitions can be found in (Diestel 2010) or any other graph theory text. We will begin
with a structure result of Irving and Leather (1986) on the stable matching problem,
a well-known problem in graph theory.
Definition 2.1. An instance of the stable matching problem (SMP) is given by
two sets M and W of finite cardinality along with a total ordering <m of some set
Wm ⊆ W for every m ∈ M , and a total ordering <w of some set Mw ⊆ M for every
w ∈ W . We denote this instance of SMP by (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ).
We think of the set M as a set of men, the set W as a set of women, and the
total orders as a ranking of the members of the opposite gender. Notice that not all
members of the opposite sex must be ranked. We often think of these ranking as
lists, with the most preferred people at the front of the lists (the smallest elements
in the ordering), and will call them preference lists. If a person a does not rank a
person b, then this means that a does not want to be matched with b. If x <v y, then
v prefers x to y. For a set of preference lists L and v ∈ M ∪ W , we will use firstL (v),
secondL (v), and lastL (v) to denote the first, second, and last person on the list of v,
respectively (where first is most preferred and smallest in the ordering). We omit the
subscript L when unambiguous.
Definition 2.2. Let (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ) be an instance of SMP. Then, let G be a
4

bipartite graph with bipartition (M, W ), with the edges of G containing the allowed
pairs in a matching. We call G the associated graph or underlying graph of the instance
of SMP . A matching A of G is a set of edges in G such that for all e1 , e2 ∈ A, either
e1 = e2 , or e1 is not incident to e2 in G. For v ∈ M ∪ W , let vA denote the vertex
that v is matched to in A (if that vertex exists). If G is an associated graph for an
instance of SMP, then we impose another restriction on the definition of matching:
for all v1 v2 ∈ A, v1 is on the list of v2 and v2 is on the list of v1 .
Definition 2.3. For an instance (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ) of SMP with associated graph
G, a matching A ∈ E(G) is stable if there does not exist an edge mw ∈ E(G) \ A in
which the following two conditions hold:
1. m is unmatched in A, or w <m mA
2. w is unmatched in A, or m <w wA
In terms of men and women, a stable matching is a matching in which there is no
man-woman pair allowed by the graph that both prefer each other to their current
partner. The following notation will be used throughout this thesis.
Definition 2.4. For an instance (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ) of SMP, m ∈ M , w ∈ W ,
let rm (w) be the rank of w in m’s preference list, and rw (m) be the rank of m in
w’s preference list, where rank is the position in the preference list. For example,
rm (first(m)) = 1.
It is well known that for any instance of SMP, a stable matching exists. In the case
that |M | = |W | and G = Kn,n , the Gale-Shapley algorithm gives a stable matching
that is man-optimal. That is, the Gale-Shapley algorithm returns a matching such
that for each m ∈ M matched with w ∈ W , there does not exist a matching in which
m is matched with a vertex w0 where w0 <m w. This algorithm, however, only gives
one specific type of stable matching, and does not give much insight into the other
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stable matchings which may exist. This motivates a structure result on the set of all
stable matchings. Pittel (1989) shows that the expected number of stable matchings
is asymptotic to e−1 n ln n, and Balinski and Ratier (1997) show that the maximum
number of stable matchings is exponential. Thus, having a structure on the stable
matchings rather than an enumerated list, is desired.
For the remainder of the chapter, unless specifically stated otherwise, assume that
(M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ) is the relevant instance of SMP with associated graph Kn,n , and
all preference lists are full. That is, |M | = |W | = n, and all pairs are allowed in a
matching. First, we must present the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Algorithm 2.1. Each man and woman begins as not engaged.
1. Choose a man m who is not engaged. This man m proposes to the most
preferred woman w on m’s list who m has not yet proposed to.
2. If w is not engaged, or if w is currently engaged to someone less preferable to m,
then w tentatively accepts the proposal from m. We say m and w are engaged.
If w accepts m’s proposal and w was previously engaged to m0 , then w and m0
are no longer engaged.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until all men are either engaged or have proposed to all
women.
Note the following obvious properties of this algorithm.
Proposition 2.1.

1. Each man m ∈ M proposes to the women on m’s list in

order, starting with the most preferred woman, until the algorithm terminates.
So, as the algorithm progresses, the woman that m is engaged to can only get
worse for m.
2. For each w ∈ W , as the algorithm progresses, the man that w is engaged to
can only get better for w.
6

Theorem 2.5. (Gale and Shapley 1962) The Gale-Shapley algorithm terminates and
results in a perfect stable matching A.
Proof. First, we show that the algorithm terminates, and results in a perfect matching. Suppose that the algorithm terminates, and there is a man m ∈ M who is not
engaged at the end of the algorithm. This means that every woman rejected m. For
a woman to reject m, she needs to be engaged, which means that every woman is
engaged. Therefore, by the Pigeonhole Principal, every man is engaged, contradicting that m is not engaged. So, if the algorithm terminates, it results in a perfect
matching A. The algorithm terminates simply because no man proposes to the same
woman twice, and so the termination condition in step 3 is clearly achieved.
We must now show that A is stable. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
there exists m ∈ M, w ∈ W, mw ∈
/ A such that w <m mA and m <w wA . Then, by
Proposition 2.1 (1), m must have proposed to w before proposing to mA . So, since
m will not propose to the next person unless he is rejected, we see that w rejected
m. So, by Proposition 2.1 (2), wA <w m, contradicting our assumption. Therefore,
A is stable.
Consider the example shown in Figure 2.1. This example will be used as we
continue to work towards the structure result.

Figure 2.1 (Irving, Leather, and Gusfield
1987) Male and female preference lists (total
orders).
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Execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm on this example provides the following
stable matching in pairs from M × W :
{(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 7), (4, 5), (5, 4), (6, 6), (7, 8), (8, 2)}.
See Appendix A for details on how the algorithm results in these pairs. The appendix
also discusses the creation of shortlists, described in the next section, but can be read
the first time by ignoring the discussion of removing people from lists. We will need
the following useful results. Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 were likely first proved by Gale
and Shapley, and proofs can be found in the references in parentheses.
Proposition 2.2. (Gusfield and Irving 1989) In any stable marriage, no man receives
a better choice than the one that he receives as a result of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Thus, all executions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm result in the same stable matching,
which we call the male-optimal matching.
Proof. Let A be a matching resulting from the Gale-Shapley algorithm. For m ∈ M ,
let α(m) denote the most preferred match for m out of all matches that appear in
some stable matching. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that in A, there is some
m ∈ M such that mA 6= α(m). Then, by Proposition 2.1, in the execution of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, there is some man m who is rejected by his optimal partner
over all possible stable matchings, α(m). Let m be the first such man, during the
execution of the algorithm, who is rejected by α(m), and suppose that α(m) rejects
m because α(m) is engaged to m0 . Also, let O be a stable matching in which m is
matched with α(m).
First, rα(m) (m0 ) < rα(m) (m) by our assumption. Moreover, rm0 (α(m)) < rm0 (α(m0 ))
because m was the first man rejected by his optimal pair, so m0 has not yet been rejected by α(m0 ) when he is engaged to α(m). Then, by definition of α, we have that
rm0 (α(m)) < rm0 (α(m0 )) ≤ rm0 (m0O ). So, since rm0 (α(m)) < rm0 (m0O ) and rα(m) (m0 ) <
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rα(m) (m), we contradict the stability of O. So, for all m ∈ M , mA = α(m), which
indicates that A is male-optimal.
Proposition 2.3. (McVitie and Wilson 1971) In any stable marriage, no woman
receives a poorer choice than the one she receives in the male-optimal solution.
Proof. Let O be the male-optimal matching obtained by the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that woman w is matched with a man m in
a stable marriage A such that rw (m) > rw (wO ). By definition of male-optimal, we
know that rwO (w) < rwO ((wO )A ). This contradicts the stability of A. Note that
w 6= (wO )A , since mw ∈ A and m 6= wO .

2.2

Shortlists

Now, we will present shortlists. The creation of shortlists is the first step in the
algorithm of Irving and Leather (1986) that gives a partial order related to the set of
all stable matchings. Consider the male-optimal solution given by the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. During the Gale-Shapley algorithm, when w ∈ W receives a proposal
from m, remove all m0 ∈ M such that m0 >w m from the list of w. Moreover, if
m0 ∈ M was removed from the list of w in this process, then remove w from the list
of m0 . The resulting lists after execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are called the
male-optimal shortlists, presented by Irving and Leather (1986). Figure 2.2 shows
the shortlists in our example from Figure 2.1. See Appendix A for details on the
construction of these shortlists.
The following statement is obvious.
Lemma 2.1. For all w ∈ W , while creating the male-optimal shortlists by running
the Gale-Shapley algorithm, people can only be removed from the end of w’s list.
In particular, men are removed from w’s list when w is matched to someone more
preferable, and the Gale-Shapley match of w is never removed.

9

Figure 2.2 (Irving, Leather, and
Gusfield 1987) Male and female
male-optimal shortlists

Proposition 2.4. (Irving and Leather 1986) If x is not on y’s shortlist, then there
does not exist a stable matching in which x is matched to y.
Proof. First, assume x ∈ M and y ∈ W , and let S be the matching resulting from
the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Note that since y did not reject yS , we know that yS
is on y’s shortlist. Now, for sake of contradiction, assume that xy ∈ A, for a stable
matching A. Since x is not on y’s shortlist, ry (yS ) < ry (x) by Lemma 2.1. This
contradicts Proposition 2.3. So, x and y cannot be matched in a stable matching.
We cover the case of when x ∈ W and y ∈ M by noting that a woman w is removed
from a man m’s list only when m is removed from w’s list.
Note, however that the converse is not true: that if A is a perfect matching in
Kn,n such that x is on y’s shortlist and y is on x’s shortlist whenever xy ∈ A, then
A is stable. For example, if we begin with the male-optimal stable matching in
our example {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 7), (4, 5), (5, 4), (6, 6), (7, 8), (8, 2)} and “switch” 4 and
5 by matching man 4 with female 4 and man 5 with female 5, we obtain the matching
{(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 7), (4, 4), (5, 5), (6, 6), (7, 8), (8, 2)}. This matching is not stable, since
male 4 prefers female 1, and female 1 prefers male 4 to their current match. From
now on, we use first, second, and last to refer to the corresponding elements of the
male-optimal shortlists unless otherwise specified.
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Proposition 2.5. (Irving and Leather 1986) For m ∈ M , w = first(m) if and only if
m = last(w). Moreover, m is matched with w in the male-optimal solution.
Proof. Let O be the male-optimal matching. By the construction of the shortlists of
W , the last element of each woman’s shortlist must be her match in the male-optimal
solution. Now, suppose that there exists w ∈ W on the shortlist of m ∈ M such that
rm (w) < rm (mO ). Then, m proposed to and got rejected by w in the Gale-Shapley
algorithm. Now, w did not remove m from her shortlist. So, rw (m) ≤ rw (wO ).
However, w rejected m’s proposal, so we have a contradiction. Thus, the shortlist of
every man does not contain any woman better than mO .
The results above show that the shortlists are a shorter version of the original
total orders, but do not lose any information about the set of stable matchings. Note
that the same process can be done by switching the roles of the men and women,
to create female-optimal shortlists. Figure 2.3 shows the female-optimal shortlists
in our example. These shortlists are created by taking the preference lists in Figure
2.1, reversing the roles of men and women, and running the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
These shortlists are not shown by Irving and Leather, but are easily verifiable, since
the first elements of the women’s original lists form a permutation.

Figure 2.3 Male and female
female-optimal shortlists
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2.3

Rotations

We now discuss rotations, introduced by Irving and Leather (1986), an object which
allows us to walk along different stable matchings starting from the male-optimal
solution. Assume for this section that the lists and orderings in consideration are for
the shortlists when not specified.
Definition 2.6. A rotation with respect to a set of shortlists L is a sequence ρ =
(m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ), k > 1, where mi ∈ M and wi ∈ W such that for every
0 ≤ i < k: wi = first(mi ), and wi+1 = second(mi ) (where i + 1 is mod k). These
rotations are said to be exposed in the given shortlists.
Definition 2.7. Consider the matching where all pairs in the rotation ρ “rotate”:
mi is matched with wi+1 , and any pairs not in the rotation are matched with their
same partners. We say the men and women in ρ rotate their partners.
Irving and Leather (1986) show that a matching after rotating is also stable, which
will be shown after the following definition. First, consider our example with shortlists
shown in Figure 2.2. The three exposed rotations in the male-optimal shortlists are
ρ1 = (1, 3), (2, 1), ρ2 = (3, 7), (5, 4), (8, 2), and ρ3 = (4, 5), (7, 8), (6, 6) (see Appendix
A).
Definition 2.8. Given the rotation ρ = (m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ), for each 0 ≤ i <
k, if each man x which follows mi−1 (i − 1 is mod k) is removed from the shortlist of
wi , along with removal of the corresponding women in the shortlists of M , then the
rotation is eliminated, and ρ is the eliminating rotation for any pair (m, w) such that
w was deleted from the list of m, and m was deleted from the list of w. This results
in new lists, which we still call shortlists.
Elimination of ρ2 gives the shortlists in Figure 2.4. See Appendix A for details.
Note that after a rotation is eliminated, each man is matched with the first elements of the man’s list, and each woman is matched with the last element of the
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Figure 2.4 Male and female
shortlists after elimination of ρ2 .

woman’s list in the matching after rotating. Eliminating rotations can be done consecutively to construct different stable matchings, as long as rotations exist in the
shortlists. We prove this in the same way as Irving and Leather (1986) below.
Lemma 2.2. (Irving and Leather 1986) If a set of shortlists L is obtained after a
sequence of rotations, then the following two properties hold:
1. w = firstL (m) if and only if m = lastL (w) (m ∈ M, w ∈ W )
2. w ∈ W is not in the list of m ∈ M if and only if rw (m) > rw (lastL (w))
Proof. If L is the original male-optimal shortlists, then the first property is Proposition 2.5, and the second property comes from the construction of the shortlists. So,
using induction on the number of rotations eliminated, assume that the properties
hold for L0 (created by eliminating a sequence of rotations), and that L is obtained
by eliminating a rotation from L0 .
To prove Property 1, first assume that m is not in the rotation. Then, w =
firstL (m) if and only if w = firstL0 (m), by our assumption. Then, w = firstL0 (m) if
and only if m = lastL0 (w), by induction. Then, since w cannot be part of the rotation,
we have that m = lastL0 (w) if and only if m = lastL (w). Now, if m is part of the
rotation, then it is easy to see that Property 1 holds from the definition of rotation
elimination.
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Now, for property 2, w is not in the list of m in L if and only if w was not in the list
of m in L0 or, w was eliminated from the list of m during the rotation elimination.
This is true if and only if rw (m) > rw (lastL0 (w)) (induction), or rw (lastL (w)) <
rw (m) ≤ rw (lastL0 (w)). This is true if and only if rw (m) > rw (lastL (w)), since
lastL0 (w) ≥w lastL (w).
Theorem 2.9. (Irving and Leather 1986) Eliminating a rotation from a set of shortlists results in a stable matching when each man is matched with the first woman on
the man’s shortlist.
Proof. Assume a rotation R is eliminated from a set of shortlists L to produce a new
set of shortlists L0 . Since we are proving a result about L0 , if lists are not specified,
then first, second, and last refer to L0 . Suppose that for m1 , m2 ∈ M , first(m1 ) =
first(m2 ). Then, by Lemma 2.2 (1), there is a w ∈ W such that last(w) = m1 = m2 .
So, m1 = m2 . Thus, if we show that no list is empty, we have a valid matching. It
suffices to show that if no lists in L are empty, then there are no empty lists in L0 . For
m ∈ M , the only way to remove firstL (m) from the list of m is to eliminate a rotation
containing the pair (m, firstL (m)). So, if R does not contain the pair (m, firstL (m)),
then m’s list in L0 is not empty. Otherwise, R contains the pair (m, firstL (m)), and
firstL0 (m) = secondL (m), so m’s list in L0 is nonempty in this case as well. Since
m ∈ M was arbitrary, all men’s lists in L0 are not empty. Thus, we have a perfect
matching. Note that this also means that all women’s lists are nonempty.
We must now show the matching is stable. Suppose m ∈ M prefers w ∈ W to
his current match first(m). Then, since first(m) is the most preferred person on the
list of m, w is not on the list of m. So, m is not on the list of w. So, by Property
2 of Lemma 2.2, rw (m) > rw (last(w)). Since last(w) is the partner of w, we have
shown that there cannot exist a pair preferring each other to their current partner,
so indeed we have a stable matching.
We list some other important results without proof below.
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Theorem 2.10. (Irving and Leather 1986) Every stable matching can be obtained by
eliminating a sequence of rotations.
Note that after eliminating a rotation, the resulting matching is worse for men
and better for women (in terms of preference). Thus, Theorem 2.9 and Theorem 2.10
give the following Corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Eliminating all rotations from the male-optimal shortlists results in
the female-optimal solution when pairing each man with the first woman on his list.
Proposition 2.6. (Irving and Leather 1986) Every pair (m, w) can appear in at
most one rotation over all possible shortlists ((m, w) may appear in a rotation on
more than one set of shortlists, but the rotation that (m, w) is a part of is always the
same).
Proposition 2.7. (Irving and Leather 1986) If (m, w) belongs to a rotation, then in
a set of shortlists obtained by a sequence of rotation eliminations, w is absent from
m’s list if and only if the rotation containing (m, w) has been eliminated.
Proof. Suppose that (m, w) belongs to a rotation R and w is absent from m’s list.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that R has not been eliminated. Then, at some
point, w must have switched partners to last(w), and rw (last(w)) < rw (m). Assume
that the shortlists of interest are the shortlists immediately after the aforementioned
step. Then, since the first element of any man’s list can only change when eliminating
a rotation, we also see that rm (first(m)) < rm (w). The stable matching resulting
from the current set of shortlists pairs m with first(m) and w with last(w). Call
this stable matching A. By Theorem 2.9, there also exists a stable matching B such
that mw ∈ B. So, m and w both prefer their match in A over their match in B.
Let MA and WA (respectively MB and WB ) denote the sets of men and women who
have more preferred partners in A than in B (respectively B than in A). Then,
m ∈ MA and w ∈ WA . Every man in MA has an A-partner in WB , because B is
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stable. Additionally, every woman in WB has a B-partner in MA , because A is stable.
Therefore, |MA | ≤ |WB | and |WB | ≤ |MA |, and so |MA | = |WB |. So, there are no
B-pairings between MA and WA . This is a contradiction, since mw ∈ B.
It is not difficult to show from these results that for any stable matching A, there
is a unique set of rotations R which must be eliminated in order to obtain shortlists
corresponding to the stable matching A. Moreover, the order of elimination in R does
not matter, provided that the rotations can be eliminated in that order. Consider the
relation ≺ on the set of all rotations R, where π ≺ ρ if and only if π must be eliminated
before ρ is exposed. Note that ≺ is a strict partial order. Irreflexivity holds, since
any rotation ρ does not need to be eliminated before eliminating ρ. Transitivity and
asymmetry clearly hold as well. The reflexive closure  given by π  ρ if and only
if π ≺ ρ or π = ρ is a non-strict partial order (the standard definition of partial
order). A downward closed set S ⊆ R is a set such that for all π ∈ S, if ρ ∈ R
and ρ ≺ π, then ρ ∈ S. Then, the downward closed sets in (R, ) are in one-toone correspondence with the set of stable matchings, which is shown in (Irving and
Leather 1986). In particular, the downward closed sets indicate which set of rotations
to eliminate. Constructing this poset gives rise to many applications.
Definition 2.11. The poset corresponding to an instance I of SMP, denoted (RI , I ),
is its rotation poset. The subscript I will be omitted when unambiguous.
Irving and Leather also show that the construction of the rotation poset can be
done in O(n2 ) time. Table 2.1 is a list of all rotations in our example, and Figure 2.5
is the Hasse diagram of the rotation poset. The calculations were done by Irving and
Leather. The table of rotations also includes weights, which are defined in Chapter
4.
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Table 2.1 List of rotations and weights
Rotation Name
ρ1
ρ2
ρ3
ρ4
ρ5
ρ6
ρ7
ρ8
ρ9
ρ10

Rotation
(1,3), (2,1)
(3,7), (5,4),
(4,5), (7,8),
(1,1), (6,5),
(2,3), (3,4)
(4,8), (7,6),
(3,3), (8,1)
(2,4), (5,8),
(1,5), (5,7),
(3,1), (7,2),
(5,3), (4,6)

(8,2)
(6,6)
(8,7)
(5,2)
(6,7)
(8,3)

ρ10
ρ9
ρ7
ρ5
ρ1

ρ8
ρ4
ρ2

ρ6
ρ3

Figure 2.5 Hasse
diagram of the
rotation poset
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Weight
0
1
2
-2
-2
1
1
0
-1
0

Chapter 3
The General Case of the Stable Marriage
Problem
There are many variations of the stable marriage problem. Manlove et al. (2002)
shows several of these variations. We will focus on three of the most basic generalizations here, and they will be described below.
1. The case that the underlying graph is a not necessarily complete bipartite graph
2. The case that the preference lists are incomplete
3. The case that |M | =
6 |W |
We will first explain what we mean by each case and then show without difficulty
that case 1 and case 3 can both be modeled by case 2. What is meant by the last
case is clear. The number of men and women are not the same, so the best we
can hope for is to match all members of the smaller set. For the first case, we add
another parameter to the SMP problem as a graph G such that G is bipartite with
partition classes M and W . That is, we have an instance (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W , G).
Now, a stable matching in this setting is still a matching A ⊆ E(G) such that there
does not exist mw ∈ E(G) \ A such that m prefers w to his partner in A (or m is
unmatched) and w prefers m to her partner in A (or w is unmatched). The graph
G is a structure which restricts the possible pairings in a matching. As an example,
consider a man m and a woman w who live too far away from each other for a match
to be pratical. Then, mw should not be an edge in G. Now, case 2 is when some men
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and women do not list certain people on their preference list, because they refuse to
be matched with these people. It is clear that the first case can be modeled by the
second case by simply removing all of the nonadjacent pairs in G in the preference
lists, and adding edges to form a complete bipartite graph. The third case is also
easily modeled by the second case by simply adding people with empty preference
lists of the appropriate gender until |M | = |W |. Therefore, it is enough to consider
case 2 in these three generalizations. Note that if w is on m’s preference list and m is
not on w’w preference list (or vice versa), then there can be no matching that matches
m and w, so we may simply remove w from m’s preference list without changing the
possible matchings. Thus, we will assume in this case that m is on w’s preference list
if and only if w is on m’s preference list.
In fact, we can always take a case 2 instance of SMP and transform it into the
case of Chapter 2 where |M | = |W |, G = Kn,n , and all preference lists are full. This
idea is made precise in Theorem 3.1 below. For the purpose of this theorem, a person
y is on the preference list of x if and only if xy is an edge in the underlying graph of
the instance of SMP. This allows for ease of notation, and from the discussion above,
we do not lose any generality.
Theorem 3.1. Let I = (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W , G) be an instance of SMP with incomplete
preference lists, where G contains precisely the edges given by the preference lists.
Then, create a (standard) instance of SMP S with underlying graph Kn,n by adding
to the end of each incomplete preference list all missing members of the opposite sex,
in any order. Then, the following statements are true:
1. If AS is a stable matching in S, then AI := AS ∩ E(G) is a stable matching in
I.
2. If AI is a stable matching in I, then there exists a stable matching AS in S such
that AI = AS ∩ E(G).
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Proof. (1) Let mw ∈ E(G) \ AI where m ∈ M and w ∈ W . We will show that mw
does not violate the condition of stability of AI .
Case 1: mmAS , wAS w ∈ E(G). Then, mAI = mAS and wAI = wAS , so from the
stability of AS , it cannot be the case that both w <m mAI and m <w wAI , so the
condition is not violated.
Case 2: mmAS ∈ E(G), wAS w ∈
/ E(G). Then, mAI = mAS , and w is unmatched
in AI . Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that w <m mAI . Note that we must have
m <w wAS since wAS w ∈
/ E(G) and mw ∈ E(G), so this contradicts the stability of
AS . Therefore, w >m mAI . So, mw does not violate the condition of stability. The
case that mmAS ∈
/ E(G) and wAS w ∈ E(G) is symmetric.
Case 3: mmAS ∈
/ E(G), wAS w ∈
/ E(G). Then, w <m mAS and m <w wAS . This
contradicts the stability of AS . So in fact, case 3 cannot happen.
(2) Let AI be a stable matching of I, and let U ⊆ V (G) be the set of vertices
unmatched in AI . Then, let B be a stable matching of U (with smaller preference lists
which do not include V (G) \ U ). We claim that AS := AI ∪ B is a stable matching.
Let mw ∈ E(Kn,n ) \ AS where m ∈ M and w ∈ W . We wish to show that mw does
not violate the condition of stability of AS . First, assume that mw ∈ E(G).
Case 1: mmAS , wAS w ∈ E(G). Then, mAI = mAS and wAI = wAS , so from the
stability of AI , it cannot be the case that both w <m mAS and m <w wAS , so the
condition is not violated.
Case 2: mmAS ∈ E(G), wAS w ∈
/ E(G). Then, m <w wAS . Suppose then that
w <m mAS = mAI . Since AI is stable and w is unmatched in AI , this means
mAI <m w, which is a contradiction, so w ≥m mAS . Thus, mw does not violate
stability in AS . The case that mmAS ∈
/ E(G) and wAS w ∈ E(G) is symmetric.
Case 3: mmAS , wAS w ∈
/ E(G). Then, m and w are unmatched in AI , which
contradicts the stability of AI , so case 3 cannot happen.
Now, assume that mw ∈
/ E(G). It is only possible for w <m mAS if mmAS ∈
/
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E(G), so assume that mmAS , wwAS ∈
/ E(G). This means that m, w, mAS , wAS are all
unmatched in AI . Thus, by stability of B, mw can not violate the stability of AS .
Theorem 3.1 essentially states that it is sufficient to only consider the case of
Chapter 2. When an edge in E(Kn,n ) \ E(G) is assigned to a stable matching of S,
we simply ignore that edge in the stable matching of I. This can lead to duplicate
stable matchings of I when unmatched vertices in AI are matched in different ways
in AS .
Now, we give an example of the third case. First, we do not extend the shortlists
in order to show why Theorem 3.1 is necessary. The Gale-Shapley algorithm given
in Chapter 2 will still result in a stable matching in the general case. For example,
suppose |M | = 3 and |W | = 4, and consider the preference lists shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 Male and female preference
lists for an example with |M | =
6 |W |

The Gale-Shapley algorithm executes to give the following matching (in M × W ):
A1 := {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 2)}. The shortlists are shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Male and female
male-optimal shortlists for an
example with |M | =
6 |W |
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The statement that every woman is matched with the last man on her shortlist
does not hold here, since woman 4 is not matched with anyone. To solve this, we first
convert to case 2 by adding an extra man with an empty preference list. Then, we
may use Theorem 3.1 by adding to the end of each list all members of the opposite
sex who are not in the original preference lists. Figure 3.3 shows the extended lists in
our example. This leads to matchings with male 4 matched to female 4, which after
intersecting with the original edges (defined by the preference lists), results in female
4 being unmatched.

Figure 3.3 Extending the preference lists
to include man 4

Another stable matching exists: A2 := {(1, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}, which can be obtained
by eliminating the rotation (1, 3), (2, 1) from the male-optimal shortlists. Note that
A1 is clearly more beneficial to men than A2 , and A1 is male-optimal if we extend
the definition of male-optimal. That is, a matching is male-optimal if every man that
can be matched in a stable matching is matched to his best possible partner among
all stable matchings. In fact, we prove a known and useful result that all stable
matchings cover the same set of vertices.
Proposition 3.1. Let I = (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W , G) be an instance of SMP with possibly incomplete preference lists, where xy ∈ E(G) if and only if x and y are on each
other’s lists. Then, if A1 and A2 are stable matchings, A1 and A2 cover the same set
of vertices of G.
Proof. Let A1 and A2 be two stable matchings of G. Suppose that these matchings
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do not cover the same vertices. Then, without loss of generality, suppose there exists
x0 that is matched in A1 , but unmatched in A2 . Then, let x1 be such that x0 x1 ∈ A1 .
Now, since x0 is unmatched in A2 , x1 must be matched in A2 , so let x2 be such that
x1 x2 ∈ A2 . Then, x0 x1 x2 is an alternating path between edges of A1 and A2 . Continue
this process to form an alternating path x0 x1 . . . xk , where xk is only matched in one
of A1 or A2 . Note that we will not result in a cycle, since x0 is unmatched in A2 .
Now, xk−2 <xk−1 xk , because xk is unmatched in one of the matchings, and xk−1
could match with xk instead of xk−2 . If k − 2 = 0, then this is a contradiction, since
xk <xk−1 xk−2 , as xk−2 is unmatched in A2 . If k > 2, then xk−3 <xk−2 xk−1 , because
if xk−1 <xk−2 xk−3 , then k − 2 would switch to k − 1 in one of the matchings. We
continue this process until we arrive at the conclusion that x0 <x1 x2 . This is a
contradiction, since x0 is unmatched in A2 . Therefore, we conclude that A1 and A2
must cover the same vertices.
One other generalization that is worth mentioning is the many-to-one stable
matching problem. We have two groups A and B such that for each b ∈ B, b can be
matched with up to kb people in group A. This generalization is being currently used
to match medical students to residency programs in the National Resident Matching
Program (How the Matching Algorithm Works 2016). In this case, A is the set of
medical students, and B is the set of hospitals. The elements of A and B still rank
the members of the other group as in the original problem. To define stability, we
think of each element b as a list of kb slots. Then, a matching is stable if there does
not exist a ∈ A and a slot s who both prefer each other to their current match.
This problem can be specialized to an instance of SMP by simply adding kb copies
of b for all b ∈ B. These copies will all have the same lists as b did, and for each
a ∈ A that had b on a’s list, b is replaced by the list of kb copies of b in any order
(consecutively and in the same position that b was). The proof of this generalization
is straightforward and will not be shown.
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Chapter 4
Applications of the Stable Marriage Structure
We begin with an application of the rotation poset. For this chapter, assume that
(M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W , Kn,n ) is the relevant instance of SMP with full preference lists,
and P is its rotation poset, unless stated otherwise. Consider the task of finding
the “best” stable matching. There are many ways to try to define best, and two
definitions which appear in (Manlove et al. 2002) are below.
Definition 4.1. Let A be a stable matching. Then, for v ∈ V (G), we say cA (v) :=
rv (vA ) is the cost of A for v. We denote w(A) =

P

v∈V (G) cA (v)

to be the weight of

A, and r(A) = maxv∈V (G) cA (v) to be the regret of A. An egalitarian matching is a
matching whose weight is minimized, and a minimum regret matching is a matching
whose regret is minimized.
The weight is just the sum of the cost of each person’s match, so it is the average
cost multiplied by |V (G)|. Thus, the weight is a measure of average happiness. Regret
is a measure of the worst match in the matching. These definitions seem to be the
most natural way to weigh a stable matching, but there is nothing inherit about
these definitions being the “correct” way to measure a matching. Gusfield (1987)
describes a way to find a minimum regret matching in O(n2 ) time (where n = |M |).
Irving, Leather, and Gusfield (1987) present how to use the rotation poset to find an
egalitarian matching in O(n4 ) time, and we will present the idea here. The following
definition appears in (Irving, Leather, and Gusfield 1987).
Definition 4.2. Let ρ = (m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ) be a rotation. The weight, w(ρ),
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of the rotation is
w(ρ) =

k−1
X

k−1
X

i=0

i=0

(rmi (wi+1 ) − rmi (wi )) +

(rwi (mi−1 ) − rwi (mi )),

where i − 1 and i + 1 are taken mod k.
Table 2.1 provides the weights of all the rotations in our running example.
Proposition 4.1. (Irving, Leather, and Gusfield 1987) Let A be a stable matching,
and let R be the set of rotations corresponding to A. Then, w(A) = w(O)+

P

ρ∈R

w(ρ),

where O is the male-optimal solution.
Proof. It suffices to show that if S is a stable matching and S 0 is a stable matching
resulting from eliminating a rotation ρ = (m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ) from S, then
w(S 0 ) = w(S) + w(ρ). For any edge mw ∈ S such that (m, w) is not in ρ, we have
that mw ∈ S 0 , so this pair does not affect any change in weight from S to S 0 . Now,
for every 0 ≤ i < k, mi is matched with wi in S, and mi is matched with wi+1 in S 0 .
Also, wi is matched with mi in S, and wi is matched with mi−1 in S 0 . Thus:
w(S 0 ) = w(S) +

k−1
X

rmi (wi+1 ) + rwi (mi−1 ) − (rmi (wi ) + rwi (mi ))

i=0

= w(S) + w(ρ)

Thus, finding an egalitarian matching is equivalent to finding the closed set of
minimum weight in P . Intuitively, the male-optimal and female-optimal solutions
should be “bad” matchings compared to other stable matchings. The male-optimal
solution in our example has weight 55. It is apparent from the results stated previously
that the female-optimal solution is a result of eliminating all rotations. Thus, we can
calculate the weight of the female-optimal solution by adding the weight of the maleoptimal solution and the weight of all rotations. We calculate the same weight of 55
for the female-optimal solution. However, by the egalitarian metric, the male-optimal
and female-optimal solutions are not the worst: consider that eliminating rotations
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ρ1 , ρ2 , and ρ3 result in a stable matching with weight 58. On the other side of the
spectrum, the closed subsets of minimum weight have weight -1, and {ρ1 , ρ2 , ρ5 } is
one such example, shown in (Irving, Leather, and Gusfield 1987). Eliminating these
rotations results in an egalitarian matching of weight 57.
Though finding an egalitarian matching for an instance of SMP can be done in
polynomial time, Feder (1992) shows that finding an egalitarian matching for the
roommate problem (see the next chapter) is NP-complete.
Now, let us consider a more arbitrary metric on the set of stable matchings.
Definition 4.3. Let A be a stable matching and let k be a positive real number.
Then, for v ∈ V (G), we say cA (k, v) := rv (vA )k is the k-cost of A for v. We denote
w(k, A) =

P

v∈V (G) cA (k, v)

to be the k-weight of A. A k-optimal matching is a

matching whose k-weight is minimized.
A k-optimal matching is just a matching in which the sum of the k’th powers of
the ranks are minimized. In particular, when k > 1, there is a greater penalty for
matching a person to somebody low on his or her preference list. Thus, when k is
higher, a k-optimal matching is more similar to a minimum regret matching than
to an egalitarian matching. When k < 1, there is a greater reward for matching
a person to somebody low on his or her list. That is, there is a larger penalty for
somebody changing from their first choice to their second choice than there is for
someone changing from their penultimate choice to their last choice. We can find a
k-optimal matching in the same way as we found an egalitarian matching.
Definition 4.4. Let ρ = (m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ) be a rotation. The k-weight,
w(k, ρ) of the rotation is
w(k, ρ) =

k−1
X

k−1
X

i=0

i=0

(rmi (wi+1 )k − rmi (wi )k ) +

(rwi (mi−1 )k − rwi (mi )k ),

We obtain a proposition analogous to Proposition 4.1. It is stated without proof.
The proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 4.1.
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Proposition 4.2. Let A be a stable matching, and let R be the set of rotations
corresponding to A. Then, w(k, A) = w(k, O) +

P

ρ∈R

w(k, ρ), where O is the male-

optimal solution.
Thus, using the same algorithmic idea, we can find a k-optimal matching in polynomial time. The notion of high k being similar to minimum regret is made precise
below. First, we need a lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For any n ≥ 2, there exists k 0 ≥ 1 such that for all integers a and b
with 1 ≤ b < a ≤ n, and for all k ≥ k 0 , ak − bk > (2n − 1)(bk − 1). In particular,
k 0 = log(2n + 1)/ log



n
n−1



is a k 0 which satisfies the property.

Proof. We strengthen the inequality to ak −bk > 2nbk . Dividing both sides by bk , this
inequality becomes

 k
a
b

> 2n+1. Given that a > b and a and b are integers satisfying

1 ≤ b < a ≤ n, it is easy to see that a/b is minimized when a/b = n/(n − 1). So, the
inequality is satisfied if



n
n−1

k

> 2n + 1. So, k 0 = log(2n + 1)/ log



n
n−1



satisfies the

result.
Proposition 4.3. For an instance of SMP, there exists k 0 ≥ 1 such that for all k ≥ k 0 ,
any k-optimal matching is a minimum regret matching. In particular, if n ≥ 2 (where
n = |M |(= |W |)), then k 0 = log(2n + 1)/ log



n
n−1



is a k 0 which satisfies the property.

Proof. Let n = |M |. We assume n ≥ 2, since SMP is trivial when n = 1. Let k 0 be as
in Lemma 4.1 and suppose k ≥ k 0 . Let A be a k-optimal matching, and suppose for
sake of contradiction that A is not a minimum regret matching. Then, there exists
another stable matching B such that w(k, B) ≥ w(k, A) and r(A) > r(B). Suppose
that r(A) = a and r(B) = b Then, a > b. Let v ∈ M ∪ W such that rv (vA ) = a. Note
that cA (k, v) = ak . For all x ∈ M ∪ W , obviously, cA (k, x) ≥ 1, and cB (k, x) ≤ bk .
So, we obtain the following inequality.
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w(k, B) − w(k, A) =

X

(cB (k, x) − cA (k, x)) + (cB (k, v) − ak )

x∈M ∪W,x6=v

≤ (2n − 1)(bk − 1) + (bk − ak )
So, by Lemma 4.1, w(k, B) − w(k, A) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, A
must be a minimum regret matching.
So, by using an appropriately large enough k, we may still use the rotation poset
to find a minimum regret matching. That is, if n = |M | = |W |, then we can set
k = log(2n + 1)/ log



n
n−1



and find a k-optimal stable matching.

We assumed in this chapter that |M | = |W |. Now, assume that we have incomplete preference lists, as in Chapter 3. Proposition 3.1 shows that all stable matchings
cover the same set of vertices. Suppose that this set of vertices is M 0 ∪ W 0 , where
M 0 ⊆ M and W 0 ⊆ W . Then, it makes sense in this case to define a k-optimal
matching as a k-optimal matching on the instance of SMP with sets M 0 and W 0 .
This optimizes the happiness of the people who can be matched, while ignoring the
people who cannot hope to have a match.
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Chapter 5
Generalization to the Roommate Problem
The stable roommate problem is similar to the stable marriage problem, except that
there is no bipartition: any pair of vertices may be matched.
Definition 5.1. Let F be a set of finite cardinality. Then, (F, (<f )f ∈F ) is an instance
of the stable roommate problem (SRP), where each <f is a total ordering of some set
Ff ⊆ F \ {f }. Additionally, G, a spanning subgraph of K|F | , is the associated graph
or underlying graph for the instance of SRP, where V (G) = F . This graph G gives
the allowed pairs in a matching.
We think of the total orderings as rankings of possible roommate candidates, and
use the term preference lists as in the previous chapters. Similar to the discussion in
Chapter 3, we may assume that G = K|F | , |F | is even, and all preference lists are full.
We will assume these conditions for the rest of the discussion on the stable roommate
problem. A stable roommate assignment has exactly the same definition as a stable
marriage.
Definition 5.2. For an instance (F, (<f )f ∈F ) of SMP with associated graph G, a
matching A ∈ E(G) is stable if there does not exist an edge f1 f2 ∈ G \ A in which
the following two conditions hold:
1. f1 is unmatched in A, or f2 <f1 (f1 )A
2. f2 is unmatched in A, or f1 <f2 (f2 )A
Unlike the stable marriage problem, an instance of SRP may not contain a stable
assignment. As an example, consider a set of four people {1, 2, 3, 4} such that person
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4 is the last choice for all other people, and person i most prefers person i + 1 (mod
3) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, in any perfect matching, there exists i ∈ {1, 2, 3} who is
matched to 4, and the other two people are matched to each other. In this case, i − 1
(mod 3) would prefer i, and i would prefer i − 1 over 4, so the matching cannot be
stable.
We will illustrate results with the example used by Gusfield (1988) in Figure
5.1. Additionally, when discussing the roommate problem in general, we assume that
(F, (<f )f ∈F ) is the instance of SRP unless otherwise stated.

Figure 5.1 (Gusfield 1988)
Preference lists in the
running example

In order to present the generalization of rotations, we must first use the algorithm
in (Irving 1985) which finds a stable roommate assignment, if one exists, and otherwise, states that no stable assignment exists. Terminology used by Gusfield (1988)
will be used. We will use first, second, and last as in the previous chapters. We will
sometimes refer to the first element of a list as the head of that list. We will also use
the notation rf (g) to denote the rank of g on f ’s list, as in the previous chapters.
Definition 5.3. At any point in the algorithm, a person f is semi-engaged to first(f )
if and only if last(first(f )) = f . Any person who is not semi-engaged is free.
Algorithm 5.1. (Phase 1): Repeat the following steps:
1. If there is an empty list, end the algorithm, as there is no stable assignment.
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2. If everyone is semi-engaged, then end phase 1.
3. Choose any free person f , and for each person k who is ranked below f on
first(f )’s list, remove k from first(f )’s list and remove first(f ) from k’s list.
Then, f becomes semi-engaged to first(f ).
Definition 5.4. The set of lists after the execution of phase 1 is called the phase 1
table.
The phase 1 table in our example is shown in Figure 5.2. See Appendix A for
details on the construction.

Figure 5.2 (Gusfield 1988)
Phase 1 table in the running
example

Irving (1985) proves that in the phase 1 table, if j is missing from i’s list, then
there are no stable assignments which pair i to j. In this sense, the phase 1 table is
analogous to the male-optimal shortlists of the stable marriage problem. We present
the proof here.
Proposition 5.1. (Irving 1985) In the phase 1 table, if j is missing from i’s list, then
there are no stable assignments which pair i to j.
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the number of iterations of phase 1. If no
iterations occur, then the result is trivial. Now, suppose after n−1 (n ≥ 1) iterations,
if j is missing from i’s list, then there are no stable assignments which pair i to j.
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Now, suppose that we have run n iterations of phase 1, and that j is missing from
i’s list. If this occured before the n’th iteration, we are done by induction, so assume
that j is removed from i’s list in the n’th iteration. We may assume without loss of
generality that i is removed from j’s list before j is removed from i’s list. We may
assume then that i is removed from j’s list when a person k becomes semi-engaged
to j, where j = first(k) and k <j i. Suppose there is a stable assignment A such
that ij ∈ A. Then, by induction, since j = first(k) and anyone not on j’s list after
n − 1 iterations cannot be matched with j, we know that j <k kA . So, we have a
contradiction to the stability of A.
Since there are no stable assignments when the phase 1 table has an empty list, we
will always assume that the phase 1 table has no empty lists. Next, we must present
rotations. The following definitions should look similar to the definitions used in the
stable marriage problem. If ei ∈ F , then hi := first(ei ) and si := second(ei ).
Definition 5.5. An exposed rotation R in a table T is an ordered subset of people
E = (e0 , e1 , . . . , er−1 ) such that si = hi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < r, where i + 1 is taken mod
r. This is often written R = (E, H, S), where H is the set of head entries of E in
the corresponding order of E, and S is the set of second entries in the same order.
Though H determines S, we use both H and S for ease of notation.
Definition 5.6. Let R1 = (E1 , H1 , S1 ) and R2 = (E2 , H2 , S2 ) be rotations, and let
E = ((e1 )0 , (e1 )1 , . . . , (e1 )r−1 ) and E2 = ((e2 )0 , (e2 )1 , . . . , (e2 )r−1 ). Then, R1 and R2
are equivalent if there exists an integer k (0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1) such that (e1 )i = (e2 )i+k ,
(h1 )i = (h2 )i+k , and (s1 )i = (s2 )i+k for all 0 ≤ i < r, where addition is taken mod r.
This is an equivalence relation, and so we say that R1 = R2 .
Definition 5.7. An exposed rotation R = (E, H, S) is eliminated in the following
manner: for every si ∈ S, every entry below ei in si ’s list is removed, and then si is
removed from k’s list for each k who was removed from si ’s list.
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Figure 5.3 shows the result of a rotation eliminated from the phase 1 table in
the running example. The rotation elminated is R = (E, H, S), where E = {1, 2, 3},
H = {2, 6, 5}, and S = {6, 5, 2}. See Appendix A for details. Next, we present the
second and final phase of the algorithm.

Figure 5.3 (Gusfield
1988) The result of
eliminating the rotation R
from the phase 1 table

Algorithm 5.2. (Phase 2): Repeat the following steps:
1. If there is an empty list, end the algorithm, as there is no stable assignment.
2. If every person has precisely one entry on their list, end the algorithm. Matching
each person with the the entry on their list results in a stable assignment.
3. Otherwise, eliminate a rotation (one does exist).
It is easy to see that during the second phase of the algorithm, all people remain
semi-engaged to somebody at every step. We state this without proof.
Lemma 5.1. (Irving 1985) During phase 2, at every step, all people who have nonempty lists remain semi-engaged to somebody. That is, for all f1 ∈ F , first(f1 ) = f2
if and only if last(f2 ) = f1 .
From this lemma, we easily obtain the following.
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Lemma 5.2. If no lists are empty, then for a table after any step of phase 2, the first
elements of all the lists form a permutation of F .
Proof. Since no list is empty, it suffices to show that there does not exist g, f1 , f2 ∈ F ,
f1 6= f2 such that first(f1 ) = first(f2 ) = g. Suppose that there do exist such elements
g, f1 , f2 . Then, last(g) = f1 = f2 , which contradicts that f1 6= f2 .
Irving (1985) shows that this algorithm take O(n2 ) time. Henceforth, we shall
refer to this algorithm as the roommate finding algorithm or RFA. We construct a
decision tree for RFA based on the available choices of rotation eliminations at each
step. Every vertex of the tree represents a table, with the root of the tree being
the phase 1 table. Let this tree be D. Different paths on D may lead to the same
assignment. Gusfield (1988) gives a nice figure of D for our running example shown
in Figure 5.4.
Definition 5.8. If R = (E, H, S) is a rotation, then we define Rd := (S, E, E r ) to
be the dual of R, where E r is a cyclic rotation of E such that the first element of
d

E r is the second element of E (note H r = S). Note that Rd = R. If R and Rd are
both rotations in D, then they are called a dual pair of rotations. If R is a rotation
in D and Rd is not a rotation in D, then R is called a singleton rotation. Using the
rotation names in Figure 5.4, (R4 , R5 ) and (R2 , R6 ) are dual pairs, while R1 and R3
are singleton rotations. This is sated in (Gusfield 1988).
The following are important results for our purposes.
Proposition 5.2. (Gusfield 1988) All stable roommate assignments can be reached
by an execution of the algorithm along some path of D.
Proposition 5.3. (Gusfield 1988) Every path from the root of D to a leaf contains
every singleton rotation and exactly one of each dual pair of rotations.
Proposition 5.4. (Gusfield 1988) Two different paths of D containing the same set
of rotations leads to the same table.
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Figure 5.4 (Gusfield 1988) The decision tree D. There are three stable
assignments: A, B, and C. In the rotations, the three columns represent E, H,
and S, in that order.

These three results give many of the necessary steps in proving the main structure
theorem below. We present a couple of the key lemmas in proving the correctness of
RFA. These lemmas appear in (Gusfield 1988), but were first proved in (Irving 1985).
Lemma 5.3. (Irving 1985) If T is a table (during phase 2) where no list is empty,
and at least one person has more than one entry, then there is a rotation exposed in
T.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that a person e0 has more than one entry.
That is, h0 and s0 exist. Lemma 5.2 shows that the head entries are a permutation
of F . Thus, there exists a person e1 such that s0 is the head of e1 . We will show
that e1 must have at least 2 people on his or her list. Suppose not. Then, first(e1 ) =
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last(e1 ) = s0 , and so by Lemma 5.1, first(s0 ) = last(s0 ) = e1 (e1 and s0 are both semiengaged to each other). Therefore, e1 is the only person on s0 ’s list. This contradicts
that e0 must be on s0 ’s list. Thus, the triples (e0 , h0 , s0 ), (e1 , h1 , s1 ) exist, where
h1 = s0 . We similarly build this sequence (e0 , h0 , s0 ), (e1 , h1 , s1 ), . . . , (ek , hk , sk ) until
hk = hi for some i < k. This must happen, since |F | is finite. Then, our exposed
rotation is (ei , hi , si ), . . . , (ek−1 , hk−1 , sk−1 ).
Definition 5.9. We say a stable assignment A is contained in a table T if for all
ij ∈ A, j is on i’s list and i is on j’s list in T .
Lemma 5.4. (Irving 1985) Let R = (E, H, S) be an exposed rotation in a table T ,
and let A be a stable assignment contained in T . Then, if ei ∈ E and (e1 , h1 ) is a
pair in A, then (ei , hi ) must also be a pair in A for all ei ∈ E.
Proof. We assume that (e1 , h1 ) is a pair in A, and we will show that (e0 , h0 ) is also
a pair in A. This argument will extend to show that all (ei , hi ) must be pairs in
A. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (e0 , h0 ) is not a pair in A. Then,
s0 <e0 (e0 )A , since s0 = h1 is matched with e1 . Next, since the head of e1 is h1 , we
have last(h1 ) = e1 . So, since h1 = s0 , we have last(s0 ) = e1 . Moreover, since s0 is on
e0 ’s list, e0 is on s0 ’s list. So, e0 <s0 e1 . This contradicts the stability of A.
The significance of this lemma is that if, for example, we are interested in finding
a stable assignment in which ei is not paired with hi , we can eliminate a rotation
which contains (ei , hi , si ) without losing stable assignments of interest. The last key
lemma is that if there is a rotation R = (E, H, S) and a stable assignment in T which
pairs ei and hi for some ei ∈ E, then there is also a stable assignment in T which
does not pair ei and hi . Therefore, by Lemma 5.4, eliminating a rotation does not
remove all possible stable assignments from the table. We construct a poset similar
to the rotation poset of the stable marriage problem. To do this, we use the following
result.
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Lemma 5.5. (Gusfield 1988) Suppose p is a person who must be removed from the
list of q for a rotation R to be exposed. Then, there exists a unique rotation R0 such
that R0 appears before R on every path that contains R, and R0 is the only rotation
in which elimination removes p from q’s list and that R0 appears before R on every
path that contains R.
Definition 5.10. If p must be removed from the list of q for a rotation R to be
exposed, and if R0 is the unique rotation of Lemma 5.5, then R0 explicitly precedes R.
The transitive closure of explicit precedence is clearly a partial order, and we again
call this partial order the rotation poset of the instance of SRP. In the next chapter,
we describe how to construct the rotation poset efficiently. Figure 5.5 shows the
rotation poset of our running example. Calculations were done by Gusfield (1988).
R6
R4

R5

R3
R1

R2

Figure 5.5 Hasse
diagram of the
rotation poset for
the roommate
problem example

Now, we state the main structure theorem for the roommate problem.
Theorem 5.11. (Gusfield 1988) There is a one-to-one correspondence between stable roommate assignments and the downward closed sets in the rotation poset which
contain every singleton rotation and exactly one of each dual pair.
In fact, the set of rotations in the downward closed set describes which rotations
need to be eliminated to produce the stable assignment.
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5.1

Relationship Between the Posets of SMP and SRP

In roughly the same way as in Theorem 3.1, an instance of SMP can be extended to an
instance of SRP. Consider the example of Figure 3.3. Figure 5.6 shows the preference
lists of the generalizion of this example to the roommate problem by adding all
members of the same sex to the end of each person’s list (women 1, 2, 3, and 4 are
relabled to be people 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively).

Figure 5.6
Generalization of the
example in Figure 3.3
to the roommate
problem

Figure 5.7 shows the male-optimal shortlists of the SMP example, and the phase
1 table of the corresponding instance of SRP.

Figure 5.7 Male-optimal shortlists and phase 1
table of the generalization.
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In this section, suppose ISM := (M, W, (<v )v∈M ∪W ) is an instance of SM P , and
ISR is the corresponding instance of SRP in which all members of the same sex are
placed on the end of each preference list. We also assume that the associated graph
for ISM is a complete bipartite graph, and the associated graph for ISR is a complete
graph. We first formalize the equivalence of ISM and ISR .
Proposition 5.5. A matching A is stable in ISM if and only if A is stable in ISR .
Proof. Let A be a stable matching in ISM . Suppose that A is not stable in ISR . Then,
there exists x, y ∈ M ∪ W such that rx (y) < rx (xA ) and ry (x) < ry (yA ). Since A is
stable in ISM , it must be that x and y are of the same sex. Without loss of generality,
suppose x, y ∈ M . Then, since rx (y) < rx (xA ), this indicates that xA ∈ M . This
contradicts the fact that A is a matching in ISM . So, A must be stable in ISR .
Now, suppose that A is stable in ISR . First, we must show that A is even a
matching in ISM : that there are no same-sex pairs in A. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that m1 , m2 ∈ M (without loss of generality) and m1 m2 ∈ A. Then, by
the Pigeonhole Principle, there exists w1 , w2 ∈ W with w1 w2 ∈ A. Then, clearly, m1
and w1 both prefer each other to their current partner, contradicting the stability of
A. We must now show that A is stable in ISM . This is clear, since any pair violating
the definition of stability in ISM must also be present in ISR .
Next, we present a theorem which we will use to prove a few results in (Gusfield
1988). The intersection of the male-optimal and female-optimal shortlists means for
each person x ∈ M ∪ W , to intersect both of x’s lists, while maintaining the original
ordering. Note that during construction, the relative ordering does not change in any
case.
Theorem 5.12. The phase 1 table of ISR is the intersection of the male-optimal and
female-optimal shortlists of ISM .
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Proof. Let x be in the list of m ∈ M in the phase 1 table. We first show that x ∈ W .
Suppose in contrast that x ∈ M . Then, since x is in the list of m, the last person
on m’s list b := last(m) is a male, and b is semi-engaged to m. By Lemma 5.1, the
head of b’s list is m. So, all women were removed from the list of b, which indicates
that all women removed b from their list. Since b is semi-engaged to a male, this
can only happen if last(z) is better than b for all women z. This is not possible by
the Pigeonhole Principle, as the last elements are a permutation of all people (this is
clear from Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2) and b is a male. Thus, x ∈ W . By symmetry,
we know that women only have men on their phase 1 table lists.
Note that running part of phase 1 when all free people f chosen are men (so
that every man is semi-engaged to a woman) results precisely in the male-optimal
shortlists (with the men at the end of each male’s list). Similarly, running part
of phase 1 when all free people f chosen are woman results in the female-optimal
shortlists. Therefore, if y is on the list of z in the phase 1 table, then y is on the list
of z in both the male-optimal and female-optimal shortlists.
Now, suppose without loss of generality that w ∈ W is in the list of m ∈ M in
both the male-optimal and female-optimal shortlists. We wish to show that w is in
the list of m in the phase 1 table. Suppose not. Then, w can be removed from the
list of m in one of two ways.
Case 1: A free person m0 ∈ M was chosen during phase 1 such that m0 <w m, and
so w removes m from her list (first(m0 ) = w at this point). If, in the male-optimal
Gale-Shapley algorithm, m0 proposes to w, then w would remove m from her list,
which contradicts our assumption. So, suppose that m0 does not propose to w. Then,
in the male-optimal solution, m0 is matched with someone w0 such that w0 <m0 w.
So, w0 must be in the list of m0 in the phase 1 table. However, since first(m0 ) = w at
some point, this is a contradiction, because w0 <m0 w.
Case 2: A free person w0 ∈ W was chosen during phase 1 such that w0 <m w, and
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so m removes w from his list (first(w0 ) = m at this point). A symmetric argument to
case 1 using the female-optimal algorithm proves this case.
Therefore, w is in the list of m in the phase 1 table.
One advantage of the phase 1 table then, is that the male-optimal and femaleoptimal solutions are both immediate. The male-optimal solution is the result of
pairing each man with the first woman on his row in the phase 1 table, and the
female-optimal solution is the result of pairing each woman with the first man on
her row in the phase 1 table. So, we see from Figure 5.7 that the male-optimal
solution has pairs (1, 7), (2, 5), (3, 6), (4, 8), and the female-optimal solution has pairs
(1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 7), (4, 8).
The rotation posets of SMP and SRP are very similar, and Gusfield (1988) gives
some statements about this relationship without proof. We will present the proofs
here. If (m1 , w1 ), . . . , (mk , wk ) is a rotation in ISM , and (e1 , h1 , s1 ), . . . , (ek , hk , sk ) is
a rotation in ISR , then we say these two rotations are equal if mi = ei and wi = hi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We will use the same symbol to denote two rotations that are equal
in ISM and ISR . Let ISM be the SMP instance of our most recent example. ISM has
two rotations: ρ1 = (1, 7), (2, 5) and ρ2 = (2, 7), (3, 6). Figure 5.1 shows the rotation
posets for ISM and ISR , as well as the rotations needed to be eliminated to create
each stable assignment.
First, we present a lemma which helps us prove the results in (Gusfield 1988).
Lemma 5.6. Every rotation in ISM is a rotation in ISR .
Proof. Let T be the phase 1 table of ISR and SL be the male-optimal shortlists of
ISM . Let R = (m0 , w0 ), . . . , (mk−1 , wk−1 ) be an exposed rotation in SL. For all
0 ≤ i < k, we have that mi can be matched with wi or wi+1 in some stable matching
(since in SMP, the head of a male’s shortlist is always part of a stable matching). So,
wi and wi+1 are on mi ’s list in T , since y is not on x’s row of T only when xy is not
in any stable matching. Moreover, by Theorem 5.12, it must be that the head of mi
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Table 5.1 The rotation posets of ISM and ISR , and
the set of rotations eliminated to create each stable
assignment. The top row shows the three stable
assignments.
Problem
Instance

Rotation
Poset

(1,7),
(2,5),
(3,6),
(4,8)

(1,5),
(2,7),
(3,6),
(4,8)

(1,5),
(2,6),
(3,7),
(4,8)

∅

{ρ1 }

{ρ1 , ρ2 }

{ρd2 , ρd1 }

{ρ1 , ρd2 }

{ρ1 , ρ2 }

ρ2
ISM

ISR

ρ1
ρ2

ρd1

ρ1

ρd2

is wi and the second person on mi ’s list is wi+1 . Therefore, since this holds for all i,
we see that R is exposed in T . Therefore, the lemma holds for the rotations exposed
in SL.
Next, by Theorem 5.12, the lists of males in T can be obtained from the lists
of males in SL by removing people from the end of lists. This is because T can
be obtained by running the male-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm followed by the
female-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm (see the proof of Theorem 5.12). So, since in
the female-optimal algorithm, people can only be removed from the end of the list
of a male, we see that the male lists of T are obtained from removing people from
the end of the lists in SL. Thus, for the lists of males, the effect of eliminating a
rotation R in ISM is the same as eliminating R in ISR , but without the extra people
at the end of the lists that appear in SL. These extra people will never be part of a
rotation (since they cannot be matched with the person who owns the list), and so
all rotations in ISM are rotations in ISR .
Now, let the set of rotations of ISM be RSM . Let IW be the instance of SMP after
switching the roles of M and W , and let RW be the set of all rotations in IW . Let
(RSR , ) be the rotation poset of ISR .
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Lemma 5.7. RSM and RW both contain all singleton rotations and one of each dual
pair of rotations in RSR .
Proof. Lemma 5.6 shows that all rotations in ISM are rotations in ISR . The proof of
the lemma shows that we can eliminate RSM in ISR , with the head of each man being
the match in the result from eliminating RSM in ISM . By Corollary 2.1, this matching
is the female-optimal solution in ISM . By Theorem 5.12, since the last person of a
male’s lists in the female-optimal shortlists is the male’s female-optimal match, we
see that eliminating RSM in ISR results in each man having only one woman on his
list. Consequently, each woman only has one man on her list. So, by Theorem 5.11,
since we have a complete run of RFA, RSM contains all singletons and one of each
dual pair of rotations. By symmetry, RW contains all singletons and one of each dual
pair of rotations.
Theorem 5.13. RSM and RW partition RSR , and there is no relation between elements of RSM and RW . Moreover, if R ∈ RSM , then Rd ∈ RW , and if R ∈ RW ,
then Rd ∈ RSM . Finally, RSR does not contain any singleton rotations.
Proof. The rotations of RSM all involve men’s lists and the elements of RW all involve
women’s lists, so clearly RSM ∩ RW = ∅. So, by Lemma 5.7, RSR does not have any
singleton rotations. Moreover, no element of RSM can be related to an element of
RW , since by construction, it is clear that any predecessors of elements in RSM are
in RSM , and any predecessors of RW are in RW . By Lemma 5.6, RSM ∪ RW ⊆ RSR ,
so we must show that RSR ⊆ RSM ∪ RW . Let R ∈ RSM . Then, since R involves
men’s lists of women, Rd involves women’s lists of men. So, since RW contains one
of each dual pair and only involves women’s lists, Rd ∈ RW . Similarly, if R ∈ RW ,
then Rd ∈ RSM . So, since RSM and RW both contain one of each dual pair, we see
that RSR ⊆ RSM ∪ RW .
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Proposition 5.6. Let C be a downward closed set in RSM , and let C 0 = RSM \ C.
Also let C 0d be the duals of the elements in C 0 . Then, eliminating C ∪ C 0d in ISR
results in exactly the same stable matching as eliminating C in ISM .
Proof. Let C be a downward closed set in RSM . Then, eliminating C in ISM results
in some stable marriage A. Now, the only way to move the head first(f ) of an entry f
during phase 2 of SRP (assuming a stable matching exists) is by eliminating a rotation
which contains the pair (f, first(f )). Therefore, there exists a set of rotations Z such
that eliminating Z in ISR results in the stable assignment A, and Z ∩ RSM = C.
Since Z must contain exactly one of each dual pair of rotations, Theorem 5.13 shows
that Z \ C = C d . So, Z = C ∪ C 0d .
The converse also holds:
Proposition 5.7. Let C be a downward closed set in RSR which contains exactly
one of every dual pair of rotations. Then, eliminating C in ISR results in exactly the
same stable matching as eliminating C ∩ RSM in ISM .
Proof. The statement is clear, since the only way to move the head first(f ) of an
entry f during phase 2 of SRP is by eliminating a rotation which contains the pair
(f, first(f )).
Thus, when generalizing an instance of SMP to SRP, we obtain two disjoint posets,
one corresponding to the poset of the male-optimal SMP instance and one corresponding to the female-optimal instance of SMP, and it is enough to ignore one of the two
posets when looking at the set of stable matchings.
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Chapter 6
Applications of the Stable Roommate
Structure
In this chapter, we present how to use the structure of the stable roommate problem
to efficiently enumerate all stable assignments, presented by Gusfield (1988). This
is done in O(n3 log n + kn2 ) time, where k is the number of stable assignments, and
n = |F |. Though the number of stable assignments can be exponential, we see that
enumeration only takes a polynomial time factor of the number of stable assignments.
First, we will present the algorithm. The proof of its correctness can be found in
(Gusfield 1988). We will discuss their time bound in detail here. For a rotation R
and rotation poset Π, denote Π(R) to be {R0 |R0 Π R}.
As stated in the last chapter, it is sufficient to know the set of rotations eliminated
to produce a stable assignment. That is, if the same set of rotations are eliminated in
a different order, the same stable assignment is produced. We construct a binary tree
B. For the sake of discussion, we think of the root as the top of the tree, and children
are said to be below their parent. As in the decision tree D, each vertex of the tree
corresponds to a table after elimination of a set of rotations. We construct the tree
as follows. We begin with a node representing the phase 1 table. Then, for each node
x, if a rotation is exposed in that table, choose any exposed rotation R. That node
has possibly 2 children: one from eliminating R from x, and one from eliminating all
rotations in Π(Rd ) from x. We call the first child the left child, and the second child
the right child. If R is a singleton, R only has a left child. Gusfield (1988) shows
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that the set of leaves after this tree is produced is the set of stable assignments, with
no repetitions. Gusfield calls this the dual enumeration method. Figure 6.1 shows
the binary tree B in our running example. Again, calculations were done by Gusfield
(1988).
R2

Π(R2d )
A

R1
R3
R4
B

Π(R4d )
C

Figure 6.1 A binary tree B in
our running example. A, B, and
C are the three stable matchings
shown in Figure 5.4

6.1

Time Complexity of Building the Rotation Poset

First, the “construction” of Π takes O(n3 log n) time. In fact, it is the Hasse Diagram
of Π which will be constructed. Since RFA runs in O(n2 ) time, and there can be
at most double the amount of rotations that exist on any particular path of D (by
taking duals), there are O(n2 ) rotations in Π. Now, consider a person p. We claim
that if rotation R moves p’s head before rotation R0 does on a path P , then R preceds
R0 in Π. Note that Lemma 5.4 implies that any pair (e, h) can appear in at most
one rotation. Thus, our claim is clear, by Lemma 5.5. So, we run the algorithm once
to create a path P in D, and for every person p, we create a chain Cp of rotations
that move the head of p while moving along P . Gusfield (1988) shows that in Π,
only singleton rotations can precede singleton rotations. This is because all singleton
rotations occur in every path of P , so a rotation R preceding a singleton must be
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on every path of P . This would imply that Rd is on no path of P . That is, R is a
singleton. So, for each person p, Cp is a chain in which all singletons in the chain are
consecutively below all dual rotations. Consider that path along R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 (in
order) in the tree D in our running example. Table 6.1 shows the chains Cp using
this path. Notice that the singleton rotations R1 and R3 always precede any dual
rotations.
Table 6.1 The chains Cp in our example
C1
R4

C2
R3

R1

R1

C3

R1

C4

C5

R2

R2

C6

R3

C7

R3

C8
R4
R3

Lemma 6.1. (Gusfield 1988) Determining if a rotation R on P is a singleton or dual
rotation takes O(n2 ) time.
Proof. Let T be the table such that R represents an edge from T to someone below
T along P . Eliminate rotations from T until either Rd is exposed or R is the only
rotation exposed. In the first case, R is clearly a dual rotation. In the latter case,
we claim R is a singleton rotation. Suppose not. Then, T has 2 children in B (by
examination of the proof of the correctness of the dual enumeration method, we may
assume that T is in B in this case). The right child must contain R, since R is the
only rotation exposed in T . This is a contradiction by the correctness of the dual
elimination method, since this would result in eliminating both R and Rd . So, R
must be a singleton rotation. This process of checking if R is a singleton or dual
takes time O(n2 ), since RFA takes O(n2 ) time.
So, we use binary search on each path Cp to determine where the first dual rotation
in the chain is. By Lemma 6.1, we can find this point in O(n2 log n) time per chain,
since each Cp has length at most n − 1 (one rotation for each move of the head of
p). So, since there are n chains, we can find all rotations in O(n3 log n) time: We
47

run RFA in O(n2 ) time, constructing the chains Cp during the process (we can add
elements to the chains as we remove people from the heads of the tables), and then
determine if each rotation is a singleton or dual in O(n3 log n) time. We then list all
singleton rotations and dual pairs in O(n2 ) time.
In the dual enumeration method, it is sufficient to have the Hasse diagram HD
of Π. For the sake of the next lemma, we view HD and Π as directed graphs: there
is an edge from u to v if and only if u ≺ v.
Lemma 6.2. (Gusfield 1988), (Gusfield 1987) There exists a graph HD∗ such that
HD ⊆ HD∗ ⊆ Π and after finding all rotations, HD∗ can be constructed in O(n2 )
time. Thus, it must be that HD∗ has O(n2 ) edges.

6.2

Time Complexity of the Dual Enumeration Method

After HD∗ is constructed, what remains is the dual enumeration method.
Theorem 6.1. (Gusfield 1988) After construction of HD∗ , each stable assignment
can be found in O(n2 ) time per assignment.
Proof. The edge from a parent to a left (right) child is called a left (right) edge. A
vertex x of B is defined to be a left vertex if x is the root or if x is a left child. If x is a
leaf and left child, then there is a unique maximal path Px starting at x consisting of
only left edges, and all of these Px ’s are disjoint. The uniqueness is clear (one cannot
go down another left node after going up a left node). Suppose there is a vertex v
such that two of these maximal paths Px and Py go through v. Since the paths are
maximal and only use left edges, everything below v on Px and Py must be the same.
Everything above v must also be the same on Px and Py for the same reason that the
paths themselves are unique. So, Px = Py .
If we add the time necessary to “run” each edge of B (eliminating the corresponding rotations), we arrive at the time for the dual enumeration method. Clearly, since
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RFA runs in O(n2 ) time, each Px runs in O(n2 ) time. Thus, we charge O(n2 ) time for
each assignment which corresponds to a left child. We are then left with the time for
each right edge. We claim that each right edge e either ends in a leaf or ends at the
top of a path Px for some x. Assume e = yz where z is y’s child. Suppose that e does
not end in a leaf. If z is the top of a Px path, then we are done. If not, then since z
is not a leaf, z has a left child, so z must be on a path Px for some x. However, since
yz is a right edge, z must be the top of Px , giving a contradiction. So, if a right edge
ends in a leaf, we charge the time to the assignment the leaf corresponds to, and if a
right edge ends at the top of a path Px , then we charge the time to the assignment
that x corresponds to. So, the time needed to run the right edges is O(kt), where k
is the number of stable assignments, and t is the time necessary to eliminate a set of
rotations Π(Rd ).
We claim that t = O(n2 ). First, finding all the rotations in Π(Rd ) takes O(n2 ) time
by simply searching backwards through the tree HD∗ . We eliminate the rotations
in Π(Rd ) in the following way. For each person p ∈ F , let p0 be the highest person
on p’s list such that p0 = ei and p = si for some rotation R = (E, H, S) in Π(Rd ).
If such a person does not exist, then set p0 = 0, where 0 is just a symbol. Then, to
eliminate all rotations in Π(Rd ), for each p ∈ F , remove all people below p0 on p’s
list, and for each person q removed from p’s list, remove p from q’s list. Do nothing if
p = 0. First, p0 can be found in O(n2 ) time since we can simply check each candidate
for p0 to see if p = si in constant time (where ei = p0 ), and keep track of the best
candidates. There are O(n2 ) checks to make. Then, the removals clearly can be done
in O(n2 ) time, since the entire size of the preference lists is O(n2 ). So, the total time
for right edges is O(kn2 ). Adding this with the left edges, we still obtain O(kn2 ) time
for the enumeration of all stable assignments.
Taking O(n3 log n) time to find all rotations, O(n2 ) time to construct HD∗ ,
and then taking O(kn2 ) time to enumerate all stable assignments gives a total of
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O(n3 log n + kn2 ) time for the dual enumeration method. Figure 6.2 shows some
binary tree B resulting from the dual enumeration method. There is no specific set
of preference lists in mind. Just assume that B was constructed. Each left edge
is dashed and labeled with the maximal path it belongs to, and each right edge is
labeled with the corresponding assignment that time was charged to.
c

Pa
Pa
Pa
a

b

e

Pc
Pc
b c

Pe

d
d e

Figure 6.2 Labeled edges for
some binary tree B. Dashed
edges are left edges.
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Appendix A
Execution of Algorithms
We will present the execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and the construction of
the shortlists for the example in Chapter 2. The original preference lists are shown
in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1 (Irving, Leather, and Gusfield
1987) Male and female preference lists (total
orders).

Since no man is engaged in the beginning, we may begin with any man. We choose
man 1, and man 1 proposes to woman 3, and now man 1 is engaged with woman 3.
Then, woman 3 removes all men below man 1 on her list. In this case, she removes
just man 4 from her list. We must also remove woman 3 from man 4’s list. So, after
one round, we obtain the lists in Figure A.2.
To continue, man 2 proposes to woman 6, and now man 2 is engaged with woman
6. Woman 6 then removes man 8, 3, and 1 from her list, and men 8, 3, and 1 remove
woman 6 from their lists. Then, we may have man 6 propose to woman 6. Since
woman 6 prefers man 6 to man 2, she accepts the proposal and man 2 is no longer
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Figure A.2 Male and female lists after
one round of the Gale-Shapley algorithm

engaged with woman 6. Instead, woman 6 is now engaged to man 6. We then remove
man 2 from the list of woman 6, and consequently remove woman 6 from the list
of man 2. The resulting lists are shown in Figure A.3. So far, the engaged pairs in
M × W are (1,3) and (6,6).

Figure A.3 Male and female lists after
three rounds of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm

Next, man 3 will propose to woman 7, and since woman 7 is not engaged, man 3
becomes engaged to woman 7. Then, woman 7 removes man 7 from her list and man
7 removes woman 7 from his list. Figure A.4 shows the resulting lists.
Then, we may have man 7 propose to woman 7. Since woman 7 is engaged to
a man better than man 7 (man 3), man 7’s proposal is rejected. In fact, any time
a man proposes to somebody no longer on his list, he will be rejected, so we may
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Figure A.4 Male and female lists
after four rounds of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm

skip these steps when constructing shortlists. Thus, we need not refer back to the
original preference lists while creating shortlists. It is enough to have a man who is
not engaged just propose to the first woman on his shortened list. We have now gone
over cases of all situations in the construction of shortlists. The reader may finish the
algorithm and check the result with Figure A.5. Recall that the algorithm terminates
when all men are engaged. The resulting stable matching is the matching that comes
from pairing each man with the first woman on his shortlist (see Chapter 2).

Figure A.5 (Irving, Leather, and
Gusfield 1987) Male and female
male-optimal shortlists

Now, ρ2 = (3, 7), (5, 4), (8, 2) is a rotation in the male-optimal shortlists. Notice
that first(3) = 7, first(5) = 4, first(8) = 2, second(3) = 4, second(5) = 2, and
second(8) = 7. To eliminate ρ2 , we may begin with woman 7. Woman 7 removes
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each man who follows man 8 on her shortlist. So, woman 7 removes man 3 from
her shortlist and man 3 removes woman 7 from his shortlist. We perform the same
process with woman 4 and woman 2 to complete the process of eliminating ρ2 .
Consider the roommate problem with preference lists given in Figure A.6. We
will explain the construction of the phase 1 table for this instance of SRP.

Figure A.6 (Gusfield 1988)
Preference lists in the
running example

Since the construction of the phase 1 table is analogous to the construction of
shortlists for an instance of SMP, we will use the term propose in the obvious way.
That is, when we choose a free person f in the algorithm, we say f proposes to
first(f ). Notice that 1 is semi-engaged to 7, because last(first(1)) = last(7) = 1. We
may choose any free person, such as person 5. Person 5 proposes to 7, so person 7
removes the people below person 5 on his or her list. Specifically, 7 removes 6 and 1
from his or her list. Then, 6 and 1 must remove 7 from their lists. Figure A.7 shows
the resulting lists.
Note that at this point, 1 is no longer semi-engaged to 7. Person 1 becomes free,
so he or she may propose to person 2. Phase 1 of the algorithm will continue until
every person is semi-engaged to the head of their list. The resulting phase 1 table is
shown in Figure A.8.
Now, if E = (1, 2, 3), H = (2, 6, 5), and S = (6, 5, 2), then R = (E, H, S) is
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Figure A.7 Lists
after one round of
phase 1

Figure A.8 (Gusfield 1988)
Phase 1 table in the running
example

a rotation exposed in the phase 1 table. Notice that first(1) = 2, first(2) = 6,
first(3) = 5, second(1) = 6, second(2) = 5, and second(3) = 2. To eliminate this
rotation, we may begin with the fact that second(1) = 6, so that everyone below
person 1 on person 6’s list will be removed. So, person 2 is removed from person 6’s
list, and 6 is removed from 2’s list. To continue, second(2) = 5, so everyone below 2
on 5’s list is removed. That is, 3 is removed from 5’s list and 5 is removed from 3’s
list. Lastly, second(3) = 2, so we remove 8 and 1 on 2’s list (since they are below
3). We must also remove 2 from the list of 8 and the list of 1. This completes the
elimination of R. The resulting table is shown in Figure A.9.
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Figure A.9 (Gusfield
1988) The result of
eliminating the rotation R
from the phase 1 table
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